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I. INTRODUCTION
While perhaps a touch unconventional for an opening paragraph, I thought it
appropriate to begin this Commentary with a disclosure. During the Supreme
Court of Canada's 1996 term, I had the tremendous privilege to work as a law
clerk for Claire L'Heureux-Dub6. As most former law clerks know, working at the
Supreme Court is the legal equivalent of a September call-up to the majors in
baseball. For a short period, you're in the "big time." Though only a supporting
player, you are actually out on the field with all the names you read about in law
school and the "games" matter. It is a heady experience, and it is hard not to bask
a bit in the reflected glow of the legal stars around you.
Before you know it, however, it's all over, and you head back to the minor
leagues, be it to a law firm, the government or, in my case, to law school. As the
years go by, your "cup of coffee" in the majors becomes much more a part of your
past than your present, and the glow of having been a law clerk fades a bit in
importance. Still, while increasingly hazy, the memory of learning about the law
from one of the true legends of the Canadian justice system lingers. When I was
asked to critique my former boss's address on the Canadian Charter of Rights and
2Freedoms' ("Charter") and criminal justice, I must confess that I felt a bit like a
rookie asked to comment on Barry Bonds's swing and assess its weaknesses. Sure,
there may be the odd shortcoming, but really, who am I to say anything about it?
Like a young ballplayer, I also couldn't help feeling a bit disloyal to the person
who gave me the "break" that helped kick-start my legal career.
These feelings were more difficult to resolve than you might imagine.
Thankfully, in deciding to accept the offer to write this short piece, I remembered
that as a dissenter herself, L'Heureux-Dub6 has always been tremendously open-
minded towards dissent, a fact that makes my job considerably easier. Indeed,
although L'Heureux-Dub6 and I have always shared a great deal of common
ground in our approach to criminal justice, we have frequently disagreed on the
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correct methodology and application of the law on a number of issues, particularly
in relation to the proper role played by the Charter.
My first thought regarding her address to Crown prosecutors is that it is
vintage Claire L'Heureux-Dubd. It is straightforward, undoubtedly inspirational to
its audience, and highly provocative. It displays her empathy and natural
inclination towards the victims of criminal acts. Furthermore, it shows L'Heureux-
Dub6's willingness to speak her own mind, regardless of the conventional wisdom.
I have always believed that her many dissenting opinions were tremendously
useful for Canadian jurisprudence. To begin with, I often agreed with them. But
even in cases where I took a different view, the opinions forced opponents to apply
incredible rigor to rebut her powerfully constructed arguments. Her presence on
the Supreme Court and the unique perspective she brought to bear on criminal law
issues has been sorely missed.
That said, I also believe that on many of the issues described in her speech to
prosecutors, L'Heureux-Dubd remains a dissenting voice, and in that regard, I must
confess to being pleased. Although she makes a number of compelling points, I do
not share her view of the Charter's impact on the Canadian legal landscape. In
general, I disagree with her implicit suggestion that the Charter has effectively
hijacked Canada's trial system to the advantage of the accused and to the detriment
of victims and the general public. It is not possible to comment upon every point
raised in her address, but I will attempt to provide a different view on the Charter's
impact in Canada and will also critique two of the particular issues she raised: the
ability of corporations to use the Charter and the importance of seeking truth in the
criminal trial.
II. THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS HAS NOT TILTED THE
BALANCE IN FAVOR OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Although the title of her address is neutral in tone, I think it is pretty clear
where L'Heureux-Dubd thinks we have been and where we should go with the
Charter in relation to criminal justice. While not expressly stated as such, the
overwhelming inference from her remarks is disenchantment with the manner in
which the Charter has been utilized by criminal defendants to distort the focus of
trials at the expense of victims of crime and the "truth."
I certainly understand whence this perspective arises. The Canadian criminal
justice system, like that of all countries that derived from the British model, has
never been all that friendly to victims of crime. It remains a highly adversarial
process, where the interest of prosecuting rests in the hands of the State rather than
in the hands of the victim. Victims' interests have never figured that prominently
in the equation, and prior to the Charter's enactment, it is probably accurate to say
that they were mostly ignored.
This refusal to consider the needs of crime victims was exacerbated when the
Charter came into force. Things were bad enough when trials were focused
exclusively on deciding whether the charge in question was proven beyond a
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reasonable doubt, and the role of victims was simply to show up in court and be
grilled in cross-examination. After 1982, however, this narrow perspective
changed. Suddenly the Canadian criminal trial had a second focus: to determine
whether the defendant's guilt had been proven by constitutionally acceptable
means. To a certain extent, every criminal proceeding became as much a trial of
the State as one about the accused. Especially in the early years of the Charter, it
seemed as if not a day would pass without a court declaring that one legal
procedure or method of obtaining evidence was unconstitutional on the grounds
that it was unfair to the defendant. This ten to fifteen year early period-which
coincided with much of L'Heureux-Dubd's tenure on the Supreme Court-was a
remarkably active one for the judiciary, as courts were asked to reconsider
previously accepted methods of criminal investigation and trial procedure and
determine whether they were fair to the accused. Coupled with a fairly liberal
Supreme Court bench that was sympathetic to this approach, it certainly made for a
lot of focus upon the defendant.
Against this backdrop, it is not at all unusual to think that the Charter had
suddenly skewed the system in favor of the defendant. Victims of crime, already a
marginalized group, seemed to be less and less the focus of the trial process.
Instead, judges became fixated with ensuring a fair trial for the accused, and rights
arguments became the "flavor du jour," providing a bonanza for defense lawyers
who in older days would have been forced to plead their client guilty or conduct a
hopeless trial.3
Nonetheless, I do not believe this description provides a complete
representation of this period of time, for the reaction to these events was in many
ways as interesting as the events themselves. Prior to the Charter's enactment,
legal reform of the criminal justice system was limited generally to sporadic and
rather random involvement by the federal government.4  Parliament rarely
addressed controversial issues unless the politics of the day forced them onto its
radar screen. Criminal defendants were not the only people with reason to be
concerned about the trial process. As mentioned previously, it is not as if the pre-
Charter period was any picnic for victims either. For the most part, witnesses and
victims of crime were treated as necessary evils of the system more than anything
else. Enactment of the Charter-albeit in an indirect way-actually helped to
change this. In effect, the refocusing of the criminal trial and the flurry of
challenges against different components of the process forced the judiciary and the
government to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of the criminal justice
3 As Justice Southin eloquently noted in R. v. Leipert, [1996] 106 C.C.C. (3d) 375, 378
(B.C.C.A.), "Question: What is a narcotics case without a Charter argument? Answer: A plea of
guilty." See also Alan Gold & Michelle Fuerst, The Stuff that Dreams are Made Of'-Criminal Law
and the Charter of Rights, 24 OTrAWA L. REv. 13, 37 (1992).
4 In Canada it is the federal government-and not that of the provinces-that has
responsibility for establishing the law governing criminal proceedings.
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system, a reassessment that ultimately considered the interests of all of the
"players" within the system's sphere of influence.5
In other words, as noteworthy as it was for the initiatives taken by the Court
in favor of criminal defendants, I believe the Charter era has been equally
important in helping to develop positive judicial attitudes towards victims in the
criminal process and for the large number of legislative initiatives taken by
Parliament in response. In this way, as some commentators have already
suggested, the courts were effectively engaged in a process of "dialogue" with
Parliament.6 The jolt to the system caused by the enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms woke Parliament up to some of the inequities in
the criminal process, and, as L'Heureux-Dub6 points out in her address, a number
of useful reactions occurred.
Taking the entire series of events into account, I believe it is fair to say that in
many ways enactment of the Charter was actually beneficial to victims, as it forced
a detailed reassessment of the criminal trial process, ushering in needed changes to
the law concerning investigation, procedure, evidence, sentencing, and substantive
crimes. As L'Heureux-Dub points out, there is still plenty of work to be done,
and there will inevitably be controversial decisions that require reflection to ensure
that a proper balance between the defendant's, the victim's and the State's interests
has been correctly set.7 Still, I see little evidence to suggest that the Charter has
been used to relentlessly advance the cause of defendants at the expense of a wider
conception of "justice."
If anything, my real concern is the continued promotion of just such a
concept, for it fuels the notion that even more radical reform of the criminal justice
system is required to ensure that the guilty get their just deserts-an argument that
seems currently to possess considerable attraction, and one that prompts
unnecessary judicial and legislative (over)reaction. In hindsight, defense lawyers
might not be so happy about having used the Charter so vigorously, and having
consequently awoken Parliament from its criminal justice slumber. Nowadays,
5 The Charter has also been instrumental in giving victims of crime a legal tool to assert their
claims in court. Prior to the Charter's enactment, victims were routinely denied standing to contest
any aspect of a criminal trial. In other words, the Charter has helped to overcome the strict barriers of
the adversarial process. See JoAN BARRErr, BALANCING CHARTER INTERESTS: VIcTiMs' RIGHTS AND
THIRD PARTY REMEDIES 1-5 (2001); Alan Young, Crime Victims and Constitutional Rights, 49 CRIM.
L.Q. 432, 447-50 (2005).
6 In Canada, the notion of constitutional review as a "dialogue" between Parliament and the
judiciary (first suggested in Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between
Courts and Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 79-82 (1997)), has become a rather complicated
and controversial topic. See Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and
Legislators, 23 Sup. CT. L. REv. (2d) 7, 34-39 (2004). For my purposes here I am simply referring to
the manner in which constitutional review has provoked government reform and reassessment of
established procedures the legislature would often rather avoid addressing. See Kent Roach, Dialogic
Judicial Review and Its Critics, 23 Sup. CT. L. REv. (2d) 49, 54 (2004) ("Dialogic judicial review
may serve as a means of placing important and uncomfortable issues on the legislative agenda.").
7 L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 2, at 474.
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hardly a year goes by without significant new initiatives designed to target crime
and make defending a criminally accused more difficult, with many measures
specifically targeted to reduce the very inequities L'Heureux-Dub6 discusses in her
Commentary.
Frankly, my impression on the whole is that these days the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms acts more like a life raft for defendants than a bludgeon,
protecting them from the very worst of the legislated initiatives, as opposed to
wreaking havoc with fair and balanced measures. More than ever, as judges
retrench from earlier more generous interpretations of rights, the Charter is
becoming little more than the guarantee of a minimum "bottom line" of fair
procedure. In many areas (the protection against cruel and unusual punishment,
and the protection against unreasonable search and seizure, to name two) this
bottom line seems to sink lower with each passing year.8
As someone who has worked on both sides of the criminal trial fence,9 I
cannot see the Charter in the same light as L'Heureux-Dubd. Indeed, with each
new legislative proposal, I find myself saying thanks for even the minimal
protection the Charter does provide, for any remaining naivet6 about the
government's ever increasing appetite to impose measures that are designed to
"suppress crime at all costs" has long since disappeared.' I say this as a
practitioner currently working in New Zealand, where in the absence of a fully
entrenched Charter, the government continues to float initiatives designed to
appease a law-and-order climate by moving to eliminate many cherished due
process protections, by proposing changes to unanimous jury verdicts, by acting to
minimize the flow of criminal disclosure, and by creating exceptions to the rule
against double jeopardy, amongst other plans.12
While setting a proper balance is important and there are undoubtedly areas
where use of the Charter has gone awry, I do not see the Canadian criminal justice
system as a place where rights have gone out of control. If anything, my greater
8 See David M. Paciocco, Competing Constitutional Rights in an Age of Deference: A Bad
Time to Be Accused, 14 SuP. CT. L. REv. (2d) 111, 136-37 (2001); Don Stuart, Eight Plus Twenty-
Four Two Equals Zero, 13 C.R. (5th) 50, 59-61 (1998).
9 Prior to joining the Faculty of Law, I worked first as defense counsel and subsequently as
counsel with the Federal Department of Justice.
10 One obvious and recent example involves the government's legislation on anti-terrorism,
which has been heavily critiqued as a draconian measure that ignores basic due process values. See
Kathy Grant, The Unjust Impact of Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act on an Accused's Right to Full
Answer and Defence, 16 WINDSOR REv. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 137, 166-68 (2003); W. Wesley Pue,
The War on Terror: Constitutional Governance in a State of Permanent Warfare, 41 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 267, 271-72 (2003).
1 New Zealand's Bill of Rights Act 1990 offers some protection for defendants, but is
expressly made subordinate to other legislation by section 4 of the Act. See PAUL RISHWORTH ET AL.,
THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ch.4 (2003).
12 Criminal Procedure Bill 2004, NEw ZEALAND PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY BILLS DIGEST, No.
1119 (2004), available at http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/Content/BillsDigest/l1119Criminal
Procedure.pdf.
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concern relates to a diminishing culture of rights application, a culture created in
part by the suggestion that the wielding of rights by criminal defendants has gone
too far.
III. THE CHARTER IS A HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE
PROTECTED WHEN CORPORATIONS BRING CHARTER CHALLENGES
The first significant point in L'Heureux-Dubd's address suggests that the
Charter should be viewed strictly as a "human" rights document and, consequently,
the courts should be wary of acceding to claims raised by non-human legal entities.
Specifically, L'Heureux-Dub expresses concern about the use of the Charter by
corporations, with the implicit suggestion that the Charter is being utilized to
advance the interests of those who already benefit from power and advantage not
available to ordinary people.' 3  While attractive on the surface, I find this
proposition highly questionable. I could attempt to rebut it by contending that the
rights in the Charter need to be applied to all, and that corporations are no less
deserving of protection than individuals. Still, I prefer to look at the issue from a
utilitarian perspective, for I believe that allowing corporations to bring these
challenges is positive for the very individuals about whom L'Heureux-Dub
expresses the greatest concern.
It is simply not clear to me that the advancement of human rights issues in
Canada would have come as far as it has if not for the very challenges by
corporations that L'Heureux-Dub6 seems inclined to halt or temper. It should
come as no surprise that securing access to justice in Canadian courts is an
immensely expensive proposition. Many Charter challenges would never arise if
corporations were barred from advancing claims, as individuals would be
completely unable to fund them.' 4 As L'Heureux-Dub6 points out in her address,
Big M Drug Mart possessed no particular religion when it challenged the
mandatory Sunday closing laws that had been founded for a purely religious
purpose, but it is unfathomable to think that its position was not shared by many
individuals and smaller businesses who were disadvantaged by the same
discriminatory law and who were unable to challenge it because of financial
restrictions.' 5
Naturally, in a system that relies so heavily on the concept of stare decisis,
judicial decisions on these important challenges not only benefit corporations, but
also assist the interests of individuals who will profit from the entrenchment of
13 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 476-77.
14 It is impossible to list all of the constitutional challenges raised by corporations, but one
particularly important claim-raised in the quasi-criminal setting of customs law-involved a
corporation successfully raising an equality claim (of discriminatory treatment against homosexuals)
on behalf of its customers, exposing significant problems with the customs scheme. See Little Sisters
Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.R. 1120.
15 L'Heureux-Dubd, supra note 2, at 477.
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human rights norms into the law. Hunter v. Southam, Inc.,' 6 a case referred to by
L'Heureux-Dub in her address, 7 is a case in point. This remains one of the
Charter's landmark decisions that enshrined the importance of privacy rights in the
face of government action. L'Heureux-Dub seems disheartened by the fact that a
corporation was able to benefit from a right designed to protect individual privacy,
but if the corporation had been barred from bringing the Charter claim, it would
never have bothered to raise the important-and well-argued-issues on the
appeal, potentially delaying full recognition of the rights in question indefinitely.
It is undoubtedly true that corporations are different from humans, and there
will be situations where it is inappropriate to treat them in the same way. But the
Charter is sophisticated enough to address these distinctions, and it is hardly
necessary to bar corporations as a threshold matter. As L'Heureux-Dub6 points
out in her address, 18 section 1 of the Charter, which allows the government to
impose "reasonable limits" on constitutional freedoms, tends to take into account
the nature of the interest held by the challenger of legislation. In Attorney General
of Quebec v. Irwin Toy, Ltd.,' 9 for example, the court recognized that certain forms
of speech-and in particular commercial speech--did not warrant the same level
of protection as other types. Nonetheless, this is a far cry from suggesting that the
speech should not be protected at all because it was engaged in by a corporation, a
finding which would allow unlimited restriction by the State.
The Canadian Charter of Rights is the supreme law of Canada, and I see little
reason why the government should not have to respect it, whether it turns its sights
on corporations or individuals. In the criminal sphere, the freedoms expressed in
the Charter reflect the fact that crime cannot be fought at all costs, and the
government must adhere to basic standards of justice in pursuing it. Applying this
standard to individuals and not to corporations would encourage different levels of
compliance with the Charter depending upon the target of the investigation. It
would also restrict and delay challenges to unconstitutional processes. In short, it
is an undesirable and haphazard way to approach our supreme law.
IV. THE CHARTER DOES NOT UNDULY IMPACT THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH BECAUSE
THE TRIAL HAS NEVER BEEN SOLELY ABOUT THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
A second major theme of L'Heureux-Dubd's address bemoans the manner in
which the Charter has been interpreted and implemented, contending that it "may
have weakened the criminal trial's core aim, namely the search for the truth. ' 20 In
this regard, she expresses particular concern about the use of section 24(2) (the
Charter's remedial clause that permits the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
16 [1984] S.C.R. 145, 145-46.
17 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 477.
18 id.
19 [1989] S.C.R. 927, 933-34.
20 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 481.
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evidence), the approach of appellate courts to jury charges, the ability of the
defense to raise grounds of appeal that were not contested at trial, and the
judiciary's exaggerated concern over the jury's tendency to draw prejudicial
inferences.
As always, there is validity to many of L'Heureux-Dub6's concerns. I share
her view that the current interpretation of section 24(2)-to automatically exclude
certain categories of evidence while using a balancing process to consider other
types of evidence-is both unprincipled and needlessly complicated.2' Similarly, I
agree that appellate courts have too frequently applied a magnifying glass to jury
charges, citing microscopic error as a reason for allowing a defendant's appeal. It
is certainly accurate to suggest that in these instances the search for truth suffers,
as the jury is deprived of probative evidence, or a verdict is quashed for reasons
that likely never concerned the jury at all.
Nonetheless, although it seems trite to say, the search for the truth is not the
sole objective of the criminal trial. It is important to reiterate that this search for
truth marches hand in hand with other policy goals, most critically the need to
protect due process interests of the accused, an objective that often demands
suppressing the best version of the truth. While not expressly stating it as such,
L'Heureux-Dub6 appears to be putting forth a view of the criminal trial that puts
the search for truth above all other objectives, a vision that has never been the
paradigm under which the common law criminal trial has been conducted. For
centuries, the criminal trial has placed major obstacles in front of the search for
truth when competing interests demanded it. The law concerning privilege, the
doctrine of abuse of process, and the rules on spousal competence, are just three
examples of instances where judges and Parliament have recognized that truth
occasionally needs to be subjugated to other important goals.
To be sure, the Charter has given the courts greater power to advance other
goals-most notably the State's need to comply with the Constitution-at the
expense of the truth. Certainly, the judiciary should not use-and in my view,
generally speaking, it has not used-this power recklessly. Still, its existence is
simply testament to a vision of criminal justice that recognizes that the ends do not
always justify the means, hardly an unreasonable proposition. Once again, this
vision, albeit to a lesser extent prior to the Charter's enactment, has always existed
in Canadian law. For example, more than one Crown prosecutor has sat in
frustration knowing full well that the key evidence to convict an offender was
locked up in the unreachable mind of the person's spouse. Getting at the truth, in
21 2 ALAN W. MEWErr Q.C. & PmTER J. SANKOFF, WrrNssEs ch. 21.3(f)(vii) (Supp. 2001)..
One of my concerns, however, is unlikely to be shared by L'Heureux-Dub, in particular the fact that
the automatic rule of exclusion for conscriptive evidence, leads to a "discriminatory approach to non-
conscriptive evidence [as] in order to set a balance between evidence that is admitted against that
which is excluded, the courts have set an unusually high threshold for non-conscriptive evidence,
effectively to balance the regular exclusion of conscriptive evidence." Id. at ch. 21, 21-97.
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essence, is deemed to be less important than promoting marital harmony between
spouses.22
I also question whether L'Heureux-Dub is entirely consistent with her vision
of promoting truth at the expense of other goals. Her point that defense counsel
should be restricted from being able to raise new grounds on appeal, for example,
suggests that where the defense "decides . . . as a matter of tactics ... not to put
forward a defence that is available, he must abide by that decision. 2 3  Frankly,
this seems to me to advocate the potential suppression of truth solely for the
purpose of avoiding the trouble and expense of a new trial. I am not suggesting
that the tactical choices of defense counsel should be ignored on appeal or that
retrials are desirable, but surely a lawyer's decision at trial cannot stand in the way
of a potential miscarriage of justice. From what I have seen, most appellate judges
are already too reluctant to ignore potential questions of "truth" on the basis of a
defense counsel's strategic choice.
We also seem to disagree about what actually promotes truth seeking, for
L'Heureux-Dub6's version rests upon "a strong fundamental confidence in jurors'
capacity to receive evidence, to weigh it fairly and to follow a judge's legal
instructions. '24 L'Heureux-Dub6 is critical of evidentiary principles that seek to
keep evidence from the jury, on the basis that this prevents jurors from getting at
the truth. Once again, there is nothing inherently wrong with suggesting that juries
should have access to evidence that assists them in coming to a proper resolution
on the facts, but I am concerned with the suggestion that rules designed to prevent
evidence from going to the jury implicitly hinder truth-seeking. To the contrary,
most evidence is kept from the jury for the very purpose of ensuring that the jury
does not draw an inappropriate or incorrect inference. This sentiment was well
expressed by Justice Arbour in R. v. Nol:
I am not casting doubt on the jury's ability to sort out complicated
evidence and its permissible uses. This Court has consistently expressed
its faith in the institution of the jury ....
While this Court has insisted over the years that jurors be made
privy to as much evidence as possible, we have also recognized the
necessity to exclude evidence in appropriate cases where the prejudicial
effect ... would overshadow its probative value.
22 In Canada, a spouse in most instances is neither competent nor compellable to testify at the
bequest of the State. See Evidence Act, R.S.C., ch. C-5, § 4 (1985); Salituro v. The Queen, [1991]
S.C.R. 654, 655 (permitting this exception to the general concept of "getting the truth" in the interests
of "marital harmony").
23 L'Heureux-Dub6, supra note 2, at 485.
24 Id. at 486.
25 R. v. Nodl, [2002] S.C.R. 433, 470. See also Starr v. R., [2000] S.C.R. 144, 240; R. v.
Handy, [2002] S.C.R. 908, 958 (Binnie, J., noting: "This is not to undermine our belief in the ability
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This approach seems to me to more closely agree with traditional concerns
regarding prejudicial evidence. It is one thing to believe that with proper direction
juries can avoid drawing prejudicial inferences in most cases, and something else
altogether to say that our faith in juries justifies putting prejudicial evidence in the
hands of jurors at will.26
My own research on this matter suggests that, in Canada, reliance on the
jury's purported ability to ignore the prejudicial effects of evidence has been a
major factor in permitting the admission of evidence that is excluded in other
jurisdictions.27  For example, Canada's leading decision on whether it is
permissible to cross-examine a defendant on prior convictions once he or she takes
the witness stand is peppered with references that echo the sentiments in
L'Heureux-Dubd's address. 28 In light of this belief in the jury's ability, it is hardly
surprising that Canada has developed the most liberal regime in the common law
world in terms of admitting this sort of evidence. L'Heureux-Dub6 undoubtedly
approves, but I am troubled about judicial pronouncements that admit evidence by
relying on the unproven assumption that "jurors can do it" in light of a great deal
of experience to the contrary29--experience supported by numerous research
studies suggesting that juries are unable to avoid drawing prejudicial inferences
from prior convictions. °
In essence, I am concerned with L'Heureux-Dubd's vision regarding how
"truth-seeking" plays a role in the criminal trial. In my view, a true search for truth
occasionally requires keeping evidence from the jury and allowing defense counsel
to raise new grounds of argument on appeal. Moreover, important as the truth is, I
of the jury to do its job, but it underlines the poisonous nature of propensity evidence, and the need to
maintain a high awareness of its potentially prejudicial effect.").
26 The problem is of course exacerbated by the fact that jurors do not have to provide reasons
for the decisions they make, and it is not possible to tell whether they have drawn an improper
inference or not.
27 See Peter Sankoff, Corbett, Crimes of Dishonesty and the Credibility Contest: Challenging
the Accepted Wisdom on What Makes a Prior Conviction Probative, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006); Peter Sankoff, Corbett Revisited: A Fairer Approach to the Admission of an
Accused's Prior Criminal Record in Cross-Examination (forthcoming 2006).
28 Corbett v. R., [1988] S.C.R. 670, 695 (Dickson, C.J., stating: "I do not feel that ... one
must proceed on the assumption that jurors are morons, completely devoid of intelligence and totally
incapable of understanding a rule of evidence .... ).
29 The experience I speak of refers to international comparisons and centuries of case law
concerning the worries of admitting potentially prejudicial evidence.
30 See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43-47 (1985);
Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal
Record: A Simulation Study, 2001 CRIM. L. REv. 734, 753-55; Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 407,
422-23 (1995); Diana R. Grant, From Prior Record to Current Verdict: How Character Affects
Jurors' Decisions (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Irvine) (on file with
Langson Library, University of California, Irvine).
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am quite comfortable with the notion that this value will be subordinated
occasionally to other vital goals.
V. CONCLUSION
As I stated in the introduction to this Commentary, Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 is
a woman of vision who is not afraid of challenging the status quo. She looks at the
criminal justice system, sees shortcomings, and is not worried about who she
might offend by speaking out about them. It is one of the things I admire most
about her. I certainly share her overall belief that too many aspects of the criminal
justice system simply continue unchallenged, owing to habit or tradition. I agree
that it is extremely healthy for the conventional wisdom to be tested, as the
mechanisms that we have come to take for granted must be questioned frequently
in order to ensure that they are providing proper service to the overall system.
However, having been prompted to reconsider the Charter's place in the
Canadian criminal law universe by L'Heureux-Dub6's address to prosecutors, I
find that on this occasion I cannot come to the same conclusion she does and
choose to respectfully dissent. L'Heureux-Dub6's address gives the impression of
a Charter that deeply needs to be reined in on the ground that its power risks being
abused by criminal defendants.
My own perception remains quite different. In my view, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms continues to be an important and useful tool and
one that has been a boon to Canadian criminal justice. It defines boundaries over
which the State cannot cross and in the process ensures fairer treatment for those
accused of crimes. At the same time, it has forced legislators, judges and lawyers
to think deeply about their optimal view of justice, and has also provided an
impetus for reform. Unquestionably, there are areas that need clearer scrutiny, and
not every Charter decision will be welcomed with open arms. Over time, certain
of our constitutional doctrines will undoubtedly evolve and change with the benefit
of hindsight and experience. Nonetheless, I suppose my primary message is that,
much like the title of this article suggests, as a general matter, the Charter is taking
us in the right direction.
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